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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Gary Steele is a former resident immigrant who has been 
denied admission into the United States under 8 U.S.C. 
SS 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and (a)(2)(C). The District Court found 
that Steele is not entitled to apply for any waiver of 
inadmissibility because he is an "aggravated felon." 
Instrumental to this conclusion was the District Court's 
determination that one of Steele's prior state misdemeanor 
convictions constituted a conviction of an aggravated felony 




Gary Steele is a citizen of Grenada who has been a lawful 
permanent resident of the United States since 1981. He has 
resided in New York state and has worked there as an 
electrician and musician. Steele has two daughters, four 
sisters, and three brothers, all of whom are United States 
citizens. 
 
The "rap sheet" submitted to the immigration judge as 
evidence of Steele's criminal record r eflects that Steele has 
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three New York state misdemeanor convictions.1 Steele's rap 
sheet indicates that in 1991, he was arrested for "Criminal 
Sale of Marihuana," a class A misdemeanor under New 
York's Penal Law S 221.40. We note that Penal Law S 220.40 
defines "sale" to include "giv[ing] or dispos[ing] of to 
another" so that one may be convicted of "criminal sale" 
without evidence of a sale as commonly understood. Steele 
pled guilty to this offense and was sentenced to probation 
for three years. In 1993, Steele was again arr ested for the 
same crime. Again, he pled guilty and paid a fine of five 
hundred dollars. In 1994, Steele was arr ested for the 
"Criminal Possession of Marihuana," a class A 
misdemeanor under New York Penal Law S 221.05. Steele 
pled guilty and was sentenced to community service. Steele 
served no time in jail for any of these offenses. 
 
On February 12, 1998, Steele traveled to Grenada to 
attend the funeral of his mother. He r emained in Grenada 
for one week and then returned to the United States. Upon 
arrival, Steele was questioned by an Immigration and 
Naturalization Service ("INS") officer who asked if Steele was 
a Rastafarian2 and if he used marijuana. Steele denied 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Steele, in a sworn statement, readily admitted the existence of these 
convictions to the immigration authorities. His statement provides no 
information about those convictions or the pr oceedings leading up to 
them beyond that reflected on the "rap sheet." 
 
2. Steele indeed is a Rastafarian, and this may explain his consecutive 
drug offenses. (A. 54.) Rastafarianism is a r eligion which proclaims the 
divinity of Haile Selassie, former Emper or of Ethiopia, and anticipates 
the eventual redemption of its adherents from the "Babylon" of white 
oppression. 
 
       [Rastafarianism] is a religion whichfirst took root in Jamaica in 
the 
       nineteenth century and has since gained adher ents in the United 
       States. See Mircea Eliade, Encyclopedia of Religion 96-97 (1989). 
It 
       is among the 1,558 religious groups sufficiently stable and 
       distinctive to be identified as one of the existing religions in 
this 
       country. See J. Gordon Melton, Encyclopedia of American Religions 
       870-71 (1991). Standard descriptions of the r eligion emphasize the 
       use of marijuana in cultic ceremonies designed to bring the 
believer 
       closer to the divinity and to enhance unity among believers. 
       Functionally, marijuana - known as ganja in the language of the 
       religion - operates as a sacrament with the power to raise the 
       partakers above the mundane and to enhance their spiritual unity. 
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currently using marijuana but admitted that he was 
arrested three times for marijuana-r elated misdemeanors. 
Following the interview, the INS took Steele into custody 
and served him with a formal charging document. 
 
Steele was charged with inadmissibility into the United 
States under both 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), which 
makes inadmissible any alien who has been convicted of "a 
violation of . . . any law . . . of a State . . . r elating to a 
controlled substance," and 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(2)(C), which 
makes inadmissible any alien who "has been an illicit 
trafficker in any controlled substance." At a hearing held on 
April 16, 1998, an immigration judge sustained the charges 
against Steele and ordered Steele r emoved to Grenada. The 
immigration judge also concluded that because Steele had 
committed an aggravated felony, he was barred by statute 
from any discretionary relief fr om inadmissibility, despite 
the fact that all of Steele's convictions constituted 
misdemeanors under New York state law. 
 
Steele appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
("BIA"), asserting that he had not committed an aggravated 
felony and had a right to apply for a waiver and r elief from 
deportation under 8 U.S.C. S 1182(c), 8 U.S.C.S 1182(h), 
and 8 U.S.C. S 1229b(a). Over a year later , on May 7, 1999, 
Steele's appeal was dismissed by the BIA. The BIA affirmed 
the judgment of the immigration judge that Steele was 
inadmissible and barred from any discr etionary relief 
because he had committed an aggravated felony as defined 
in 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43). 
 
On July 6, 1999, Steele filed a petition for habeas corpus 
with the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania. Steele argued, inter alia, that the BIA erred 
in determining that his misdemeanor drug convictions 
amounted to an "aggravated felony." The District Court 
determined that Steele failed to establish any legal error. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
United States v. Bayer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1556 (9th Cir. 1996). Steele has 
not claimed, nor has any court recognized, a legal right of Rastafarians 
to use marijuana as a part of their religious observance. See id. at 1556- 
59; McBride v. Shawnee County, 71 F. Supp. 2d1098, 1100 (D. Kan. 
1999). 
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Steele filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court and 
was then deported to Grenada, pursuant to 8 C.F .R. 
S 241.33 (2000) (authorizing the execution of a deportation 




The District Court correctly concluded that it had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 2241, despite the judicial 
review limiting provisions of the Anti-T errorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), Pub L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214, and the Illegal Immigration Refor m and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104- 
208, 110 Stat. 3009 (collectively "the 1996 Amendments"). 
We held in Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F .3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999), 
that the 1996 Amendments did not foreclose district courts 
from hearing petitions for habeas corpus following removal 
orders where the petitioner has been convicted of an 
aggravated felony. See Sandoval, 166 F .3d at 235 ("ADEPA 
S 440(a) and IIRIRA S 309(c)(4)(G) ar e most reasonably 
understood as foreclosing judicial review under the APA, 
and not as relating to habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2241."). We based our decision in Sandoval on a line of 
Supreme Court precedent extending back to Ex parte 
McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868), concluding that these cases 
"establish the propositions that courts should not lightly 
presume that a congressional enactment containing general 
language effects a repeal of a jurisdictional statute and, 
consequently, that only a plain statement of congr essional 
intent to remove a particular statutory grant of jurisdiction 
will suffice." Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 232. 
 
Steele's removal was administered under the permanent 
provisions of IIRIRA, which differ in some respects from the 
transitional provisions analyzed in Sandoval. Section 1252 
of Title 8 of the United States Code, as amended by IIRIRA, 
might be construed to divest district courts of jurisdiction 
to hear habeas corpus petitions where a petitioner has been 
convicted of an aggravated felony offense. See 8 U.S.C. 
S 1252(a)(1), (a)(2)(C), (b)(9). We r ecently considered this 
possibility, however, and, in accordance with our reasoning 
in Sandoval, determined that IIRIRA's permanent 
provisions do not preclude district courts from exercising 
 
                                5 
  
their jurisdiction to hear petitions for habeas corpus 
following removal orders where the petitioner has been 
convicted of an aggravated felony. Liang v. INS , 206 F.3d 
308 (3d Cir. 2000). The District Court pr operly exercised 
jurisdiction in accordance with our decision in Liang. 
 
We possess appellate jurisdiction over the District Court's 
denial of Steele's habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. SS 1291 and 2253. We review de novo the District 
Court's denial of habeas corpus relief and its interpretation 
of the applicable statutes. See Anker Ener gy Corp. v. 
Consol. Coal Co., 177 F.3d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 1999); 
DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 1999); Yang v. 
Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540, 1546 (3d Cir . 1995). We review the 
BIA's interpretation of the statutes which it administers 
under a more deferential standard. On review, if a statute 
administered by the INS is ambiguous, and the BIA has 
provided a reasonable interpretation of its language, we 
must simply ask whether the BIA's construction is a 
permissible one. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
Where the language of a statute is clear , however, the text 
of the statute is the end of the matter. See Good Samaritan 




Before turning to the principal and dispositive issue in 
this appeal, we must address a threshold issue concerning 
the relevant sections of the Immigration Act. Steele seeks 
relief from removal under 8 U.S.C.S 1182(c), 8 U.S.C. 
S 1182(h), and 8 U.S.C. S 1229b(a). W e conclude that relief 
under 8 U.S.C. S 1182(c) and 8 U.S.C. S 1182(h) is clearly 
foreclosed. Only relief under 8 U.S.C.S 1229b(a) is 
available. 
 
Section 1182(c) of Title 8 provides that waivers of 
inadmissibility might be granted to certain immigrants who 
traveled abroad for brief periods of time. Section 1182(c) 
was repealed by section 309(c) of IIRIRA, ef fective April 1, 
1997, but by its terms is still applicable to certain removal 
proceedings initiated before its ef fective date. IIRIRA 
S 309(a). Because Steele's removal was initiated after April 
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1, 1997, section 1182(c) is not an available avenue of relief 
for Steele. 
 
Steele argues that section 1182(c) must r emain available 
in his case because its unavailability would constitute a 
retroactive application of the per manent provisions of 
IIRIRA to a conviction that preceded the Act and this result 
was not intended by Congress. We find Steele's argument 
foreclosed by our opinion in DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175 
(3d Cir. 1999). In DeSousa, the petitioner was a citizen of 
Portugal who had been a lawful permanent r esident of the 
United States since 1969. The petitioner had served four 
and one-half years in prison on an aggravated assault 
charge. DeSousa claimed that IIRIRA's amendments 
restricting eligibility for section 1182(c) waivers should not 
be construed to apply "retroactively" to his case, since his 
convictions pre-dated IIRIRA. We disagr eed, finding it likely 
that Congress had intended the amended version of section 
1182(c) to apply to convictions preceding the amendment. 
Id. at 186. Because the issue was not "absolutely clear," 
however, we proceeded to analyze whether the removal of 
relief was retroactive in any sense. We concluded, in 
accordance with our earlier opinion in Scheidemann v. INS, 
83 F.3d 1517 (3d Cir. 1996), that because the statute 
related only to the discretion of the Attorney General to 
grant a future waiver, its eligibility r estriction had only 
prospective impact. Id. at 187. 
 
Steele suggests that because his case involved the 
permanent, rather than the transitional pr ovisions of 
IIRIRA, he faces a complete removal of waiver rather than 
an eligibility restriction. Steele argues that this makes his 
claim of retroactivity more plausible. We disagree. The 
transitional and permanent provisions of IIRIRA were both 
passed as part of the 1996 Amendments, and wer e 
motivated by the same Congressional concer ns. Steele's 
proffered distinction between the eligibility restrictions 
under the transitional provisions and the complete repeal 
under the permanent provisions is a distinction without a 
difference; in either case, the availability of relief under 
section 1182(c) is categorically foreclosed. 3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We acknowledge that this holding, though mandated by DeSousa, is 
inconsistent with our sister Court's holding in Tasios v. Reno, 204 F.3d 
544, 550-552 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the repeal of the 1182(c) 
waiver under the permanent provisions of IIRIRA has retroactive effects). 
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Relief under section 1182(h) is also foreclosed in Steele's 
case. Under 8 U.S.C. S 1182(h) the Attor ney General may 
waive the inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) 
of an alien convicted of a controlled substance offense if 
that alien's inadmissibility relates to a single offense of 
simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana. Here, 
Steele has admitted to committing more than one offense 
for which he could be found inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 
S 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Thus, a waiver under section 1182(h) is 
unavailable. 
 
Of the three forms of relief sought by Steele, only 8 
U.S.C. S 1229b(a) remains viable. That section provides that 
the Attorney General "may cancel removal in the case of an 
alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United 
States if the alien-- (1) has been an alien lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence for not less than 5 years, (2) has 
resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after 
having been admitted in any status, and (3) has not been 
convicted of any aggravated felony." Steele has met the first 
two criteria required to make him eligible for waiver under 
8 U.S.C. S 1229b(a), and insists that he has met the third 
because he has not been convicted of an aggravated felony. 
We will now proceed to examine this claim.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Steele is no longer in federal custody, yet he seeks to appeal the 
denial 
of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Although neither party argues 
that Steele's appeal is moot, we are required to raise issues of standing 
sua sponte if such issues exist. See FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of 
Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 838 (3d Cir . 1996). A section 2241 
petitioner must be incarcerated at the time his petition is filed. Though 
continued custody is normally a requir ement for habeas corpus 
jurisdiction thereafter, there ar e exceptions to this rule. Where a 
petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus is filed and subsequently the petitioner is 
released from custody, habeas corpus jurisdiction may be sustained 
where serious collateral consequences flow fr om the conviction. See 
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55-56 (1968); United States v. Romero- 
Vilca, 850 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir . 1988) (finding the possibility of 
deportation to be a serious collateral consequence of a conviction). 
 
Though the Supreme Court has disapproved of broad presumption of 
collateral consequences without specific findings of injury-in-fact, see 
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-17 (1998), we conclude that Steele has 
alleged facts sufficient to show a continuing injury and serious 
collateral 
 




Section 1101(a)(43) of Title 8 defines the term 
"aggravated felony" as used in the Immigration Act. It 
provides that an aggravated felony is any "illicit trafficking 
in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 
21), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 
924(c) of Title 18)." 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(B). 
 
Despite the "including" connector, the BIA has 
interpreted this definition as encompassing two categories 
of felony offenses: those involving "illicit trafficking" in a 
controlled substance and those involving "drug trafficking 
crime[s]" as defined in S 924(c). An offense falls within the 
scope of the first category if 1) the offense constitutes a 
felony under the law of the convicting sover eign and 2) the 
offense involves "the unlawful trading or dealing of any 
controlled substance. . . ." See Matter of Davis, 20 I. & N. 
Dec. 536, 541 (BIA 1992). Essential to the concept of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
consequences. Erroneous conviction of an aggravated felony will have 
several continuing and serious legal consequences for Steele, including 
serving as a permanent bar preventing his return to the United States to 
visit his family. See 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(9)(A) (Supp. II 1996) (imposing a 
permanent bar on admissibility for aggravated felons). A determination 
that Steele's conviction did not constitute an aggravated felony would 
alleviate many of these collateral effects. See generally Bruce Robert 
Marley, Exiling the New Felons: The Consequences of the Retroactive 
Application of Aggravated Felony Convictions to Lawful Permanent 
Residents, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 855 (1998). 
 
Our conclusion here finds support in the decisions of other courts. See 
Max-George v. Reno, 205 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 2000) (presuming 
collateral consequences from a determination of inadmissibility); Chavez 
v. United States INS, 55 F. Supp. 2d 555, 556-57 (W.D. La. 1999) (finding 
collateral consequences following deportation as a matter of law). Cf. 
Ramirez v. INS, 86 F. Supp. 2d 301, 303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that 
the appeal of a deported pro se petitioner who could not be contacted 
was moot). See generally Gerald L. Newman, Symposium: Jurisdiction 
and the Rule of Law after the 1996 Immigration Act , 113 Harv. L. Rev. 
1963, 1996-97 (2000) ("[E]xecution of a r emoval order will not ordinarily 
moot the case in the Article III sense. For example, extinguishment of a 
permanent resident's entitlement to live in the United States normally 
results in continuing injury. More generally, the entry of a removal order 
creates inadmissibility barriers to futur e visits.") 
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"trading or dealing" is activity of a "business or merchant 
nature," thus excluding simple possession or transfer 
without consideration. Id. 
 
Section 924(c)(2) of Title 18 defines "drug trafficking 
crime" as meaning "any felony punishable under the 
Controlled Substance Act[,] . . . the Controlled Substance 
Import and Export Act[s] . . . or the Maritime Drug Law 
Enforcement Act. . . ." Accordingly, the BIA finds within the 
second category of aggravated felony convictions any federal 
conviction for a violation of one of the specified statutes 
that is a felony conviction under federal law, i.e., a 
conviction for an offense punishable by imprisonment for 
over one year. See 18 U.S.C. S 3559. More relevant for 
present purposes, the BIA understands this second 
category to encompass convictions for state of fenses, 
however characterized by the state, if those of fenses would 
be "punishable" under one of the three specified federal 
statutes if federally prosecuted, so long as the hypothetical 
federal conviction would be a felony under federal law, i.e., 
would be punishable by a term of imprisonment of over one 
year. 
 
This hypothetical federal conviction approach"require[s] 
a comparison between the elements of the [state] drug 
offense and [the elements of] a federal drug provision 
referenced in 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(2).. . ." Matter of Davis at 
544. Since the basis for the incapacities under the 
Immigration Act is "convict[ion] of an aggravated felony," 8 
U.S.C. S 1229b(a), the Board looks to what the convicting 
court must necessarily have found to support the 
conviction and not to other conduct in which the defendant 
may have engaged in connection with the offense. Thus 
where, as here, the Service is relying on a state 
misdemeanor conviction, the requirements of this second 
category of "aggravated felony convictions" ar e "satisfied 
[only] by proving a conviction that includes all the elements 
of [a felony] offense for which an alien`could be convicted 
and punished' under the cited federal laws." Matter of 
Barrett at 174. Accordingly, the pr oposed "analogy between 
state statutes and offenses under the cited federal statutes 
will . . . be a matter of law." Id. at 177. 
 




We find the BIA's interpretation of the statute 
troublesome in a number of respects,5 and we specifically 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Prior to 1990, 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43) defined the term "aggravated 
felony" in relevant part as "any drug trafficking crime as defined in 
section 924(c)(2) of title 18, United States Code." Under this prior 
language, 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(2) clearly pr ovided the only source for the 
definition of "drug trafficking crime." 
 
Section 924(c)(2) of Title 18, which has r emained unchanged during 
the relevant period, provides a sentence enhancement in federal 
prosecutions for defendants who have used or carried a firearm during 
or in relation to the drug trafficking crime that is the subject of the 
prosecution. It is in this context that S 924(c)(2) defines "drug 
trafficking 
crime" as "any felony punishable under" the three specified statutes. 
Thus, if one literally substituted the text of S 924(c)(2) for the text 
"any 
drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c)(2)" in S 
1101(a)(43)), 
no state offenses were included in the concept of "aggravated felony." 
 
In 1990, Congress decided that this portion ofS 1101(a)(43) should be 
changed to make clear that state drug trafficking offenses would be 
included. It did so by expanding the definition to encompass "any illicit 
trafficking in any controlled substance .. . , including any drug 
trafficking crime as defined in section 924(c) of title 18 . . ." and by 
expressly stating that the "term [aggravated felony] applies to offenses 
described in [paragraph 43] whether in violation of Federal or State law. 
. . ." 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43) (1992). 
 
The text of the statute as amended, literally r ead, creates a single 
category: state or federal offenses involving"illicit trafficking" (i.e., 
the 
marketing of drugs). Felony violation of the thr ee designated federal 
statutes are a subset of this single category. Under this literal reading 
of 
the statute, "aggravated felony" does not include state or federal 
offenses 
that do not involve the marketing of drugs. 
 
Moreover, in fashioning its hypothetical federal felony approach, the 
BIA reads the phrase "felony punishable under" as found in S 924(c)(2) 
to mean "offense punishable as a felony under." It is only by so reading 
the statute that the BIA is able to find state misdemeanor convictions to 
be convictions of aggravated felonies. This r eading is inconsistent with 
the reading of a number of Courts of Appeals in what seems to us an 
analogous setting. In several cases involving sentencing enhancements, 
Courts of Appeals have looked to state law classifications in order to 
determine if a given offense constitutes a felony under S 924(c). See 
United States v. Ibarra-Galindo, 206 F.3d 1337, 1339-40 (9th Cir. 2000) 
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reserve decision on the validity of its hypothetical felony 
approach. We may assume its validity for present purposes 
because we conclude that application of that appr oach to 
the facts of this case does not support the Service's 
position. 
 
One cannot suffer the disabilities associated with having 
been convicted of an aggravated felony unless one has been 
convicted of a felony. This, of course, means that there 
must be a judicial determination beyond a r easonable 
doubt of every element of a felony or a constitutionally valid 
plea that encompasses each of those elements. As we have 
explained, it is the BIA's understanding that these 
determinations do not have to come in a pr oceeding on a 
felony indictment if they are sufficient to satisfy the 
elements of a hypothetical felony offense under the 
Controlled Substances Act, i.e., an offense punishable 
under that act by imprisonment for more than one year. 
 
The fact that this hypothetical offense appr oach imposes 
such grave consequences on factual determinations made, 
or pleas entered, in misdemeanor proceedings is one of its 
more troubling aspects. Misdemeanor char ges are 
frequently not addressed by a defendant with the same care 
and caution as a felony indictment with its mor e serious, 
immediate consequences. This concern counsels, at a 
minimum, that we insist on sufficient formality in the 
misdemeanor proceeding to assure that each and every 
element of the hypothetical federal felony is focused on and 
specifically addressed in that proceeding. 
 
All of the state criminal proceedings against Steele were 
misdemeanor proceedings. Moreover, none of those 
proceedings involved findings or a plea satisfying the 
elements of an offense under the Contr olled Substances Act 
punishable by imprisonment for more than a year . As the 
District Court correctly determined, the elements of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(collecting cases). This is plainly inconsistent with the BIA's current 
jurisprudence in the deportation context, whichfinds state law 
consequences irrelevant. See In re K-V-D-, Int. Dec. 3422, 1999 WL 
1186808 (BIA 1999) (en banc) (Filppu, Board Member, dissenting) 
(criticizing the BIA's current interpretation for this reason). 
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misdemeanor offense of "Criminal Sale of Marijuana" are 
met if the defendant has distributed 30 grams or less of 
marijuana without remuneration. Looking to federal law, 
the District Court also correctly concluded that 
"distributing a small amount of marijuana for no 
remuneration" is treated as simple possession under 21 
U.S.C. S 844 and is punishable by a maximum term of one 
year. See 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(4). Based on these two 
conclusions, the hypothetical felony approach should have 
led the District Court to hold that Steele has not been 
convicted of an aggravated felony within the meaning of the 
Act. 
 
The District Court reached its contrary conclusion only 
by relying on a fact that was not focused on and specifically 
addressed in any of the state proceedings. It reasoned as 
follows: 
 
       [Section 844 provides that] any person who violates 
       this subsection may be sentenced to a term of 
       imprisonment of not more than 1 year, and shall be 
       fined a minimum of $1,000, or both, except that if he 
       commits such offense after a prior conviction  under this 
       title or title III, or a prior conviction for any drug, 
       narcotic, or chemical offense char geable under the law 
       of any State, has become final, he shall be sentenced 
       to a term of imprisonment for not less than 15 days 
       but not more than 2 years. . . . 
 
The District Court thus concluded that Steele's second 
misdemeanor conviction was for an offense punishable as a 
felony under the Controlled Substances Act. 
 
As the above observations of the District Court make 
clear, the distribution of 30 grams or less of marijuana 
without remuneration is not inherently a felony under 
federal law. If a United States Attorney wants a felony 
conviction, he or she must file an information under 21 
U.S.C. S 851 alleging, and subsequently pr ove, that the 
defendant has been previously convicted of a drug offense 
at the time of the offense being prosecuted. While the 
status of being "a one time loser" is not technically an 
element of the offense proscribed byS 844, we agree with 
the District Court that it can be treated as such. Since 
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distribution of marijuana without remuneration is not 
inherently a felony, it seems to us that the only alternative 
to so regarding it consistent with the rule of lenity would be 
to treat any S 844 offense in this context as a misdemeanor. 
 
The problem with the District Court's appr oach is not 
that it treated the status of being a "one time loser" as an 
element of the hypothetical federal felony. Rather , the 
problem is that Steele's "one time loser" status was never 
litigated as a part of a criminal proceeding. That status was 
not an element of the crime charged in the second 
misdemeanor proceeding against him. As a r esult, the 
record evidences no judicial deter mination that that status 
existed at the relevant time. For all that the record before 
the immigration judge reveals, the initial conviction may 
have been constitutionally impaired. Even assuming that 
Steele was prudent enough to insist on counsel in the 
second misdemeanor proceeding and even assuming 
counsel was perspicacious enough to focus on the potential 
immigration consequences, the record simply does not 
demonstrate that the prior conviction was at issue. 
 
The Service understandably stresses that Steele admitted 
to the immigration judge that there wer e three outstanding 
state misdemeanor convictions. It suggests that on this 
basis the immigration judge was entitled to conclude that 
Steele was a "one time loser" when he committed his 
second offense. Congress, however , has not left it up to the 
immigration judge to determine whether Steele committed a 
felony. As we stated at the outset of this portion of our 
analysis, the aggravated felony disability under the Act 
applies only if there has been a conviction  of a felony. It is 
one thing to accept, as we do arguendo, that the conviction 
may be of a hypothetical felony conviction; it would be 
entirely another simply to ignore the r equirement that there 




Because we conclude that Steele has not been convicted 
of an aggravated felony, hypothetical or otherwise, we will 
reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand with 
instructions to return this matter to the agency so that 
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Steele may submit an application for cancellation of 
removal in accordance with 8 U.S.C. S 1229b(a). 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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